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Abstract
This Article retraces some of the historic initiatives that have sought to establish a permanent
international criminal court and focuses on the contemporary experience of the Commission of
Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 and the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. More particularly, it reflects upon the problems of investi-
gating and prosecuting violations of international humanitarian law, and the interaction between
pursuing an international criminal justice goal and political settlements of international disputes.
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INTRODUCTION
Since the end of World War I, the world community has
sought to establish a permanent international criminal court,
but that noble goal has yet to be realized. Instead, ad hoc tribu-
nals have been established for a specific purpose and for a lim-
ited period of time.' These experiences, however, have paved
the road for the establishment of a permanent system of interna-
tional criminal justice. Following the unfulfilled efforts of World
* Former Chairman and Special Rapporteur on the Gathering and Analysis of
Facts, United Nations Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council
Resolution 780 (1992) to Investigate Violations of International Humanitarian Law in
the Former Yugoslavia; Professor of Law, President, International Human Rights Law
Institute, DePaul University; President, International Association of Penal Law; 'Presi-
dent, International Institute of Higher Studies in Criminal Sciences. This Article con-
tains the views of the Author only and not those of the Commission or the United
Nations. A version of this Article appeared in 25 SEcuRrmr DIALOGUE 409 (1994).
1. For a history of these efforts, see M. Cherif Bassiouni & Christopher Blakesley,
M. CHERIF BAssIOUNI, A DRAFr INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CODE AND DRAFr STATUTE FOR
AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL 1-21 (1987); The Need jor an International Criminal
Court in the New International World Order, 25 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 151 (1992); M.
Cherif Bassiouni, The Time has Come for an International Criminal Court, 1 IND. INT'L &
Comp. L. REv. 1 (1991); see also BENJAMIN FERENCZ, AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT:
A STEP TOWARn WoRLD PEACE (Vols. I & II 1980).
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War I, the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (IMT),2
and the International Military Tribunal for the Far East at Tokyo
(IMTFE),' were established in 1945 and 1946 respectively.
Then, in 1993, the U.N. Security Council established the Inter-
national Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTFY),
which was followed by the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR). 4
The ultimate result of all these initiatives should lead to the
establishment of a permanent international criminal court, but
that goal has yet to be attained. This Article retraces some of
these historic initiatives and focuses on the contemporary expe-
rience of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Se-
curity Council Resolution 780 and the ICTFY. More particularly,
it reflects upon the problems of investigating and prosecuting
2. Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European Axis
(London Agreement), Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, 59 Stat. 1544; Annex to Prosecu-
tion and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European Axis (London Charter),
Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, 59 Stat. 1544.
3. Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Special Procla-
mation by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers at Tokyo, T.IAS. no. 1589,
reprinted in 4 TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA 27 (1946); Charter dated January 19, 1946, T.I.A.S. no. 1589, reprinted in 4
TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 27
(1946) [IMTFE Proclamation]; Amended Charter dated 26 April 1946, T.IAS. no.
1589, reprinted in 4 TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 27 (1946) [hereinafter IMTFE Amended Charter]. For an analysis
of the Tokyo proceedings, see ARNOLD C. BRACKMAN, THE OTHER NUREMBERG: THE UN-
TOLD STORY OF THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRALS (1987); THE ToKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL:
AN INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM (C. Hosoya et al. eds., 1986); ICHARD H. MINEAR,
VICTOR'S JUSTICE: THE Too'O WAR CRIMES TRuAL (1971); BERNARD V.A. R6LING, THE
TOKYo TRIALS AND BEYOND: REFLECTIONS OF A PEACEMONCER (1993).
4. The Security Council decided to establish an international criminal tribunal to
prosecute those responsible for violations of international humanitarian law in the for-
mer Yugoslavia in Resolution 808. S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 3175th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/
RES/808 (1993). Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 808, the Secretary-General
prepared a report containing comments on the articles of the statute of the tribunal.
The tribunal's statute appears in an Annex to the Secretary-General's report. Secretary-
General, Report Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808, U.N. Doc. S/
25704/Add. I/Corr.1 (1993) [hereinafter Report of the Secretary-General]. The Security
Council adopted the Secretary-General's draft of the statute without change in Resolu-
tion 827. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993).
With respect to Rwanda, the Security Council first established a commission of
experts to investigate violations in that civil war. S.C. Res. 935, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess.,
3400th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/Res/935 (1994). Based on that commission's work, the
Security Council established a tribunal for Rwanda which has ties to the ICTFY. S.C.
Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/Res/955 (1994) (adopt-
ing and annexing the tribunal statute).
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violations of international humanitarian law, and the interaction
between pursuing an international criminal justice goal and
political settlements of international disputes.5
I. HISTORICAL PRECEDENTS
In 1919, Article 227 of the Treaty of Versailles6 purported to
create an ad hoc international criminal tribunal to prosecute Kai-
ser Wilhelm II for the "supreme offence" against peace.7 Articles
228 and 229 of the Treaty also provided that the victorious Allies
would prosecute German war criminals.' For political reasons,
however, neither treaty mandate was enforced. The Kaiser
sought refuge in the Netherlands and the Allies never pursued a
request for his extradition.9 Additionally, the victorious Allies
allowed Germany to prosecute a limited number of war
criminals before its Supreme Court sitting in Leipzig,1" in order
to avoid further alienating the Germans.
Prior to the signing of the Treaty of Versailles, the Allies
established an investigative body called the Commission on the
Responsibilities of the Authors of War and on Enforcement of
Penalties at the Preliminary Peace Conference (the "Commis-
sion").11 There were, however, no institutional links between
the investigative Commission and the judicial bodies subse-
quently established by the Treaty of Versailles. Consequently,
the findings of the Commission were neither binding nor con-
5. See generally Anthony D'Amato, Peace vs. Accountability in Bosnia, 88 AM.J. INT'L L.
500 (1994); Theodor Meron, The Case for War Crimes Trials in Yugoslavia, FOREIGN AFF.,
Summer 1993, at 122; Theodor Meron, War Crimes in Yugoslavia and the Development of
International Law, 88 AM.J. INT'L L. 78 (1994);James C. O'Brien, The International Tribu-
nalfor Vriolations of International Humanitarian Law in the Former Yugoslavia, 87 AM. J. INT'L
L. 639 (1993).
6. Treaty of Peace with Germany (Treaty of Versailles), 11 MARTENS NouvEAu
RECUEIL [M.N.R.] (3D) 321, 323 (1919).
7. Id.
8. Id. arts. 228-29, 11 M.N.R. at 324.
9. The government of the Netherlands viewed the charge against the Kaiser as a
"political offence," because a Head of State's decision to go to war is within the preroga-
tive of national sovereignty. See Quincy Wright, The Legality of the Kaiser, 8 AM. POL. ScI.
REv. 121 (1919).
10. See CLAUD MULLINS, THE LEIPZIG TRIALS: AN ACCOUNT OF THE WAR CRIMINALS
TRIALS AND A STUDY OF GERMAN MENTALITY (1921);JAMES WILLIS, PROLOGUE TO NUREM-
BERG: THE POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY OF PUNISHING OF WAR CRIMINALS OF THE FIRST
WORLD WAR (1982).
11. This Commission was established by the Preliminary Peace Conference of
Paris, which produced the Treaty of Versailles.
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clusive as to any party or against any person. Out of the 20,000
people investigated, the Commission identified 895 persons be-
lieved to have committed war crimes.1 2 Despite the Commis-
sion's extensive report, only twelve military officers were con-
victed before the Imperial Supreme Tribunal of Germany at
Leipzig.'"
The 1919 Commission also sought to charge persons for
crimes against the laws of humanity14 based on the preamble to
the 1907 Hague Convention,'" but the United States and Japan
were opposed.1 6 The charges were to be brought against Turk-
ish military and political officials for the mass killing of Armeni-
ans in 1915.17 These charges were also based on the authority of
the Treaty of Svres of 192018 between the Allies and Turkey,
which provided for Turkey's surrender of accused persons to be
tried for war crimes and presumably for "crimes against the laws
of humanity." Political considerations, however, caused the Al-
lies to change their mind. As a result, the provisions of the
Treaty of Svres were never carried out, because the Treaty was
never ratified. In 1923, it was replaced by the Treaty of Lau-
sanne,19 which did not mention prosecutions and in fact con-
12. COMMISSION ON THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE AUTHORS OF WAR AND ON EN-
FORCEMENT OF PENALTIES, REPORT PRESENTED TO THE PRELIMINARY PEACE CONFERENCE,
PAMPHLET No. 32 (1919), reprinted in 14 AM. J. INT'L. L. 95 (1920) [hereinafter 1919
COMMISSION REPORT].
13. Id. The maximum sentence imposed was three years, erasing any hope that
this formal exercise could serve as a future deterrent to others. During these proceed-
ings, the accused were cheered by crowds attending the trials and outside the court-
rooms. The accused were transformed from war criminals to national heroes and mar-
tyrs of foreign oppression. Thus, what was intended to be a punitive action to deter
such conduct in the future actually gave rise to nationalistic fervor.
14. See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HuMANTrY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMI-
NAL LAW (1992) [hereinafter CRIMES AGAINST HuMANTrrv].
15. Convention Regarding the Laws and Customs of Land Warfare, Oct. 18, 1907,
3 M.N.R. 461, 36 Stat. 2277 (1908).
16. See 1919 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 12, at 144-50; Memorandum of Reserva-
tions Presented by the Representatives of the United States to the Report of the Commission on
Responsibilities, Annex II, Apr. 4 1919, reprinted in 14 AM. J. INT'L L. 95, 127 (1920);
Reservations by the Japanese Delegation, Annex III, Apr. 4 1919, reprinted in 14 AM. J. INT'L
L. 95, 151 (1920).
17. See Vahakn N. Dadrian, Genocide as a Problem of National and International Law:
The World War I Armenian Case and its Contemporary Legal Ramifications, 14 YALEJ. INT'L L.
221 (1989).
18. Treaty of Peace Between the Allied Powers and Turkey, signed at SRvres, Aug.
10, 1920 (Treaty of Svres), 1920 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 11 (Cmd. 961), reprinted in 15 AM.J.
INT'L L. 179 (Supp. 1921).
19. Treaty with Turkey and Other Instruments, signed at Lausanne, July 24, 1923
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tained an annex that gave Turkish officials amnesty. By 1923,
the "political will" of the Allies to pursue justice in the sense of
prosecuting and punishing violators of international humanita-
rian law had all but dissolved.
In 1926, the International Association of Penal Law and the
International Law Association undertook a significant initiative
with the Inter-Parliamentary Union for the establishment of a
permanent international criminal court.20 Their efforts proved
unproductive. The world, it was then said, was too disparate and
not ready for such an international institution. In 1927, my
predecessor as President of the International Association of Pe-
nal Law, Vespassien Pella, was Romania's delegate to the League
of Nations and in 1937 was one of the principal sponsors for the
establishment of a specialized international criminal court to en-
force the Terrorism Convention.2 1 The members of the League
of Nations were all eager to eradicate terrorism with a war of
words, but few were willing to take collective action. Thus, only
India ratified this instrument and the court never came to be.
Interestingly enough, neither one of these initiatives ad-
dressed the question of investigations. Indeed, diplomats who
negotiate and draft treaties are far removed from the realities
and exigencies of criminal investigations. Consequently,
whether from lack of experience or some other motive, the re-
quirements of effective investigation are seldom addressed in
such treaties.
A few years later, the atrocities of World War II made the
need for international prosecutions inevitable. The victorious
Allies established the International Military Tribunal at Nurem-
berg through the London Agreement of August 8, 1945, to
which the IMT's Charter was appended.2 The Agreement was
signed by the four Major Allied Powers and later acceded to by
(Treaty of Lausanne), 1923 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 16 (Cmd. 1929) reprinted in 18 AM.J. INT'L
L. 1 (Supp. 1924).
20. In recent times, Parliamentarians for Global Action have made this initiative
one of its principal goals. See JAMES A. LEACH & M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, PARLIAMENTARI-
ANS FOR GLOBAL ACTION, OCCASIONAL PAPER No. 1: AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
(Oct. 1992).
21. Annex to Convention for Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, Nov. 16,
1937, League of Nations OJ. No. 19, at 23, League of Nations Doc. C.546(1) M.383(1)
1937 V (1938).
22. See London Agreement, supra note 2, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, 59 Stat. 1544; London
Charter, supra note 2, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, 59 Stat. 1544.
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nineteen states. Subsequent to the London Charter, the Allies,
as Germany's occupation forces, enacted Law No. 10 by Ger-
many's Control Council, which permitted the Allies to prosecute
German nationals in their respective zones of occupation.2 3 Fol-
lowing, in 1946, General Douglas MacArthur, in his capacity as
Supreme Allied Commander for the Pacific Theater, promul-
gated an order establishing the International Military Tribunal
for the Far East.24 All three tribunals were ad hoc institutions
limited as to both subject matter and in personam jurisdiction.
The IMT and IMTFE relied on their investigative units to
produce the evidence on which the prosecution relied. -No sepa-
rate or special investigative bodies were established. In both
cases, the Four Major Allies contributed resources, personnel,
and information. Because each Allied Power had its own "Chief
Prosecutor,"25 he relied essentially on the investigations con-
ducted by his own country. In IMT proceedings, however, the
U.S. team provided most of the investigative support to the other
three Allies. Whereas, in IMTFE proceedings, the United King-
dom and Australia shouldered a significant part of that burden
along with their U.S. counterpart. 26 In connection with Control
Council Law No. 10 Proceedings, the Four Major Allies relied on
separate investigative and evidence gathering capabilities of
their military forces. The United States and the United King-
dom cooperated much more closely, but both had difficulty se-
curing cooperation from the USSR, as did France.
The separate investigations occurred, even though the Al-
lies set up an international investigative commission. An "Agree-
ment," signed at the Palace of St. James on 13 January 1942,27
23. Allied Control Council Law No. 10, Punishment of Persons Guilty of War
Crimes, Crimes against Peace and against Humanity, Dec. 20, 1945, OFFICIAL GAZETTE
OF THE CONTROL COUNCIL FOR GERMANY, No. 3, Berlin (Jan. 31, 1946), reprinted in 1
FERENCZ, supra note 1, at 488.
24. IMTFE Proclamation, supra note 3; IMTFE Amended Charter, supra note 3.
25. See, e.g., ROBERT H. JACKSON, REPORT TO THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON
MILITARY TRIALS (U.S. Dep't State Pub. no. 3080, 1949).
26. For the IMTFE proceedings, see THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIALS: THE COM-
PLETE TRANSCRIPTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR
THE FAR EAST (R. John Pritchard & Sonia M. Zaide eds., 1981); THE TOKYO JUDGMENT
(Bernard V.A. R61ing & C. Fritz Refiter eds., 1977).
27. The Inter-Allied Declaration, signed at St. James Palace on 13 January 1942,
reprinted in PUNISHMENT FOR WAR CRIMES: INTER-ALLIED DECLARATION SIGNED AT ST.
JAMES PALACE, LONDON, ON 13 JANUARY 1942, AND RELATIVE DOCUMENTS (United Na-
tions Office, New York, undated).
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
established the 1943 United Nations War Crimes Commission
(UNWCC).28 The St. James Declaration was the first in the se-
ries of steps leading to the establishment of the IMT. Thereaf-
ter, the Moscow Declaration 29 provided for the punishment of
war criminals, but did not address the questions of investigations
and establishing a tribunal. This came up later in the London
Agreement of 8 August 1945,0 which recalled the St. James and
Moscow Declarations. Yet the 1943 UNWCC was not institution-
ally linked to the IMT or the IMTFE, nor did it play the role of
the investigative body for the IMT or the "subsequent proceed-
ings" pursuant to Control Council Law No. 10 by virtue of which
each of the Four Major Allies could prosecute Germans in their
respective zones of occupation. One would have expected the
1943 UNWCC to be the appropriate body to carry out an overall
investigative function, but lack of institutional links evidencing a
certain political will, lack of resources, and bureaucratic difficul-
ties caused the 1943 UNWCC to become a clearinghouse of in-
formation between Allied governments and governments of
countries that had been occupied by the European Axis Powers.
Thus, the only inter-governmental, treaty-created investigative
body was relegated, for no fault of its own, to a lesser role than
that expected or intended. Regrettably, the absence of political
will to support this institution further eroded its moral influence
over governments to cooperate in the pursuit of alleged war
criminals and to prosecute or extradite such persons.3 1
Thus the two internationally established investigative bod-
28. See generaly UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, HISTORY OF THE UNITED
NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAWS OF WAR (1948)
[hereinafter HISTORY OF THE UNWCC].
29. Declaration of Four Nations on General Security (The Moscow Declaration), 9
DEP'T ST. BULL. 308 (1943).
30. London Agreement, supra note 2, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, 59 Stat. 1544.
31. For example, the UNWCC had extensive evidence of crimes committed by the
Italian military in Ethiopia, Libya, Yugoslavia, and Greece during the war. Overall, the
UNWCC determined that 1286 accused Italians should be prosecuted by the Allies pur-
suant to Italy's surrender treaty. See 4 Bevans, 311 (1970); HISTORY OF THE UNWCC,
supra note 28, at 511. The UNWCC had "dossiers" alleging violations such as the killing
of innocent civilians and POWs, torture and mistreatment of prisoners, bombardments
of hospitals, destruction of cultural property, and the use of poisonous gas. See CRIMES
AGAINST HUMANrIY, supra note 14, at 85. The governments of Ethiopia, Yugoslavia, and
Greece requested extradition of the war criminals pursuant to Article 35 of the instru-
ment of surrender of Italy. The occupying forces of Italy, the United States, and the
United Kingdom, denied their requests. Subsequently, in 1946, the Italian government
also denied the requests. Id. at 227-28. At the time, fear of communism was pervasive
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ies, the 1919 Commission and the 1943 UNWCC, were not insti-
tutionally linked to the judicial bodies created by essentially the
same powers. They were also compromised by political consider-
ations when it suited the same powers that established them.
With respect to the 1943 UNWCC, the United States wanted to
control the IMT proceedings instead of allowing an interna-
tional body with all of its attendant weaknesses to be in charge of
such a delicate function as investigations. This was not, however,
the case with the 1919 Commission, where French and U.K. mili-
tary personnel were dominant and other European Allies were
supportive. The 1919 Commission produced a significant
amount of information whose value no one could deny. Unfor-
tunately, the prosecutorial power was shifted by the Allies to the
German Procurator General of the Imperial Tribunal in Leipzig.
Thus, the merits of the 1919 Commission's investigative efforts
were no longer relevant.
These historical precedents indicate that the investigations
and prosecutions should not be conducted by separate bodies,
particularly with respect to ad hoc institutions. If, however, the
purpose of the investigation is independent of prosecution,
either because prosecution is not impending, or because prose-
cution is intended to focus only on selected cases, then a sepa-
rate investigative body is necessary. The need becomes particu-
larly acute when an eventual prosecution is not likely to encom-
pass the investigation of policies and patterns of violations in
large scale victimization contexts. Thus, an independent body
capable of working as a clearinghouse for government inter-
change, such as the 1943 UNWCC, and also capable of con-
ducting its own investigation, as was the case with the 1919 Com-
mission, is indeed an appropriate formula. But nothing of the
sort ever developed.
Since the end of World War II, there have been two other
international instruments referring to the establishment of an
international criminal jurisdiction. The 1948 Genocide Conven-
tion"2 provides in Article 6:
and the Major Powers believed that reform fascists of the army were the best opponents
of communism. In short, political views prevailed over justice.
32. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
GA. Res. 260, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc A/810 (1948) (entered into force Jan.
12, 1951).
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Persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts
enumerated in article III shall be tried by a competent tribu-
nal of the State in the territory of which the act was commit-
ted, or by such international penal tribunal as may have juris-
diction with respect to those Contracting Parties which shall
have accepted its jurisdiction.3 3
Similarly, the 1972 Apartheid Convention34 establishes in Article
5 that:
Persons charged with the acts enumerated in article II of
the present Convention may be tried by a competent tribunal
of any State Party to the Convention which may acquire juris-
diction over the person of the accused or by an international
penal tribunal having jurisdiction with respect to those States
Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction.35
Although both conventions provide for an international means
of enforcement, the States Parties have opted not to establish an
international jurisdiction. Furthermore, neither the 1948 Geno-
cide Convention nor the 1972 Apartheid Convention provides
for a mechanism of investigation of the violations of their respec-
tive provisions, even in the context of referring to an interna-
tional criminal tribunal or jurisdiction. In 1979, this author was
asked by the United Nations to prepare a draft statute for the
enforcement of the Apartheid Convention. 36 But the only merit
of that endeavor was that it served as one of the models for the
International Law Commission (the "ILC") work on the estab-
lishment of a permanent international criminal court between
1992 and 1994.
After World War II prosecutions, the General Assembly
asked the ILC to elaborate a statute for a permanent interna-
tional criminal court and to codify a Draft Code of Offenses
33. Id. at 175.
34. International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of
Apartheid, G.A. Res. 3068, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Agenda Item 53, U.N. Doc. A/RES/
3068 (1973); see also M. Cherif Bassiouni & Daniel Derby, Final Report on the Establishment
of an International Criminal Court for the Implementation of the Apartheid Convention and
Other Relevant Instruments, 9 HOFSTRA L. REv. 523 (1981).
35. HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMPILATION OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS 83 (1993).
36. Study on Ways and Means of Insuring the Implementation of International Instruments
Such as the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of
Apartheid, Including the Establishment of the International Jurisdiction Envisaged by the Conven-
tional, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1426 (1980). See generally Bassiouni & Derby, supra note 34.
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Against the Peace and Security of Mankind. 7 Since 1947,
neither of these aims has yet come to fruition,8 although pro-
gress by the ILC is evident.3 9 The General Assembly at its 49th
session considered the ILC 1994 Draft Statute for an interna-
37. GA Res. 177, U.N. GAOR, 2d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/4 (1947).
38. For a history of the International Law Commission's efforts, see Leo Gross,
Some Observations on the Draft Code of Offenses against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 15
ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 224 (1985); D.H.N. Johnson, The Draft Code of Offenses Against the
Peace and Security of Mankind, 4 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 445 (1955); Sharon Williams, The
Draft Code of Offenses Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, in INTERNATIONAL CIMI-
NA. LAw 109 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1985). For a Commentary on the 1991 Final
Draft Code of Offenses Against the Peace and Security of Mankind adopted by the ILC,
see Commentaries on the International Law Commission's 1991 Draft Code of Crimes Against the
Peace and Security of Mankind, 11 NouvELLEs ETUDES PPNALES (1993).
39. See Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court: Annex to the Report of the Com-
mittee on International Criminal Court Jurisdiction, U.N. GAOR 7th Comm., 6th sess.,
Supp. No. 11, at 23, U.N. Doc. A/2136 (1952). Subsequent reports of. the Committee
on International Criminal Jurisdiction consisted of U.N. Doc. A/2186 (1952) and U.N.
Doc. A/2186/Add. 1 (1952). The discussions of the Sixth Committee and of the Gen-
eral Assembly until the end of 1952 encompassed all three reports (U.N. Doc. A/2136,
U.N. Doc. A/2186, U.N. Doc. A/2186/Add. 1). See also Historical Survey of the Question of
International Criminal Jurisdiction, Memorandum by the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/
CN.4/7/Rev. 1 (1949), reprinted in FERENCZ, supra note 1, at 399. The chronology of
relevant United Nations documents, reports and resolutions are: G.A. Res. 1187, U.N.
GAOR, 12th Sess., Supp. No. 18, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/3805 (1957) (tabling Report of the
Sixth Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction, U.N. Doc. A/3771 (1957)); G.A-
Res. 898, U.N. GAOR, 9th Sess., Supp. No. 21, at 50, U.N. Doc. A/2890 (1954) (tabling
Report of the 1953 Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction); Report of the Sixth Com-
mittee to the U.N. General Assembly considering the (Final) Report of the 1953 Committee on
International Criminal Jurisdiction (U.N. Doc. A/2645), U.N. GAOR, 10th sess., Supp. No.
9, U.N. Doc. A/2827/Corr. 1 (1954); Report of the 1953 Committee on International Crimi-
nal Jurisdiction to the Sixth Committee, U.N. GAOR, 9th sess., Supp. No. 12, at 23, U.N.
Doc. A/2645 (1953); Report of the International Law Commission on the Question of Interna-
tional Criminal Jurisdiction, U.N. GAOR, 7th sess., Supp. No. 11, U.N. Doc. A/2136
(1951); Report of the Sixth Committee to the U.N. General Assembly concerning the Report of the
International Law Commission on the Question of International Criminal Jurisdiction, U.N.
GAOR, 5th sess., U.N. Doc. A/1639 (1950); Report of the International Law Commission to
the U.N. General Assembly on the Question of International Criminal Justice, U.N. GAOR, 5th
sess., Supp. No. 12, at 18, U.N. Doc. A/1316 (1950); Report of the International Law Com-
mission on the Question of International Criminal Jurisdiction, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/15 (1950).
For current developments concerning an International CriminalJurisdiction, see Report
of the International Law Commission, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/
49/10 (1994); International Law Commission, Revised Report of the Working Group on the
Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., A/CN.4/L.490
(1993); International Law Commission, Revised Report of the Working Group on the Draft
Statute for an International Criminal Court: Addendum, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., A/CN.4/
L.490/Add. 1 (1993); Report of the International Law Commission, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess.,
Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/47/10 (1992); Report of the International Law Commission,
U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 255, U.N. Doc. A/46/10 (1991); Report of the
International Law Commission, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/
46/10 (1994). See also supra note 2.
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
tional criminal court and requested that an inter-sessional meet-
ing be held in April 1995 to examine the draft and report to the
50th session in the Fall of 1995. Nevertheless, the political will of
governments seems to be lacking thus far.40 The argument re-
mains that the world is too disparate and not ready for such a
global institution operating outside the political control of gov-
ernments, especially the permanent members of the Security
Council. But world public opinion is, on this question, ahead of
governments and demands an international system of criminal
justice.
II. LEGAL TECHNIQUES IN ESTABLISHING AD HOC
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS
In comparison, the ad hoc international criminal tribunals
of yesterday and today have the same goal - that of dispensing
justice and punishing war criminals. Earlier tribunals, however,
had their genesis in vastly different instruments. In 1919, the
parties involved in World War I established a tribunal by the
Treaty of Versailles and, thus, with the presumed consent of all
the parties, including those defeated. After World War II, the
Four Major Allies collectively established the IMT by signing the
London Agreement to which nineteen other states acceded.
The Allies, however, imposed the IMT on the defeated powers
without their presumed acquiescence.4'
General Douglas MacArthur, acting as the Supreme Com-
mander for the Allied Powers, unilaterally created the IMTFE
through a general military order.42 There was, therefore, no
treaty, nor participation in the institution-creating process by the
40. In November 1992, the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly asked the
ILC to prepare a draft statute for an international criminal court, but failed to give the
ILC any direction as to the questions the Assembly wanted answered. See GA Res. 47/
33, U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/Res/47/33 (1992); International Law Commission, Re-
vised Report of the Working Group on the Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court,
U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.490 (1993); International Law Commis-
sion, Revised Report of the Working Group on the Draft Statute for an International Criminal
Court: Addendum, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.490/Add. 1 (1993).
The 1994 ILC report on an international criminal court was published in September
1994 as the Report of the International Law Commission, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No.
10, U.N. Doc. A/49/10 (1994).
41. The IMT was presumed to be an international military tribunal but was similar
to ordinary national criminal proceedings in Europe and the U.S.
42. Yet even though MacArthur, an American General, established the tribunal,
the U.S. Supreme Court held that the tribunal was not a U.S. court. Rather, the
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defeated party. The Tokyo tribunal, though modelled on the
IMT, and appropriately called IMTFE, partook less than the IMT
of the characteristics of ordinary criminal proceedings in most
criminal justice systems of the world and more of a military com-
mission or cour martiale. Between the establishment of the IMT
and IMTFE, the occupying Allies in Germany established the ba-
sis for war crimes proceedings in their respective zones of occu-
pation. In so doing, they relied on Control Council Law No. 10,
whose legal authority was predicated on Germany's uncondi-
tional surrender. That surrender was presumed to have left the
Allies, constituted as a "Control Council," as exercising sover-
eignty over Germany.
The establishment of the ICTFY followed yet another legal
technique - a Security Council Resolution Pursuant to the
Charter's Chapter VII authority.
The United Nations progressed gradually in this endeavor
by first requiring the reporting of violations in Security Council
Resolution 771. 41 Then, the Security Council established the
Commission of Experts to investigate "grave breaches of the Ge-
neva Conventions and other violations of international humani-
tarian law" in Resolution 780." This was followed by Security
Council Resolution 808,41 which called for the establishment of
an ad hoc war crimes tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and re-
quired the Secretary-General to submit a report on "all aspects"
of the matter within sixty days.' No institutional links, however,
were established between the Commission and the eventual tri-
bunal.
France was first to present to the Security Council an in-
sightful and detailed report for the attainment of international
Supreme Court maintained that the tribunal was merely created by an "agent of the
Allied Powers." Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197, 198 (1948).
43. S.C. Res. 771, U.N. SCOR, 3106th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/771 (1992).
44. S.C. Res. 780, U.N. SCOR, 3119th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/780 (1992). See
Generally, M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security
Council Resolution 780 (1992): Investigating Volations of International Humanitarian Law in
the Former Yugoslavia, 5 CiuM. L.F. 1(1994); M. Cherif Bassiouni, The United Nations Com-
mission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), 88 AM. J.
INT'L L. 784 (1994).
45. S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 3175th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (1993).
46. Id. at 2.
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criminal justice.47 The report was prepared by a distinguished
committee of jurists chaired by Procureur General Truche with
Professor Alain Pellet, a member of the ILC, as Rapporteur.4"
Italy followed with a draft containing important textual language
relating to most of the essential elements of the eventual tribu-
nal.4" The Commission was chaired by Professor Giovanni
Conso, who later became Italy's Minister of Justice, and Profes-
sor Giovanni Grasso was the Rapporteur.5 ° Then, the Minister of
Foreign Affairs of Sweden submitted a comprehensive draft stat-
ute prepared by a committee of the CSCE chaired by Ambassa-
dor Corell of Sweden, now Under-Secretary-General and Legal
Counsel of the U.N., with the participation of Ambassadors Tu-
erk of Austria and Thune of Norway."1 This proposal was part of
a CSCE report that included substantive findings. The CSCE re-
port was triggered on August 5, 1992, by the United Kingdom
and supporting states who invoked the Moscow Human Dimen-
sion Mechanism with respect to Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croa-
tia. Under this mechanism, the CSCE submitted several reports
to the Commission of Experts.
The United States also circulated an unofficial text contain-
ing specific legal provisions covering several aspects of the pro-
spective tribunal's statute.52 Additionally, Mexico presented an
official report raising questions with respect to the Security
47. Report of the Committee of French Jurists Established to Study the Establishment of an
International Criminal Tribunal, U.N. Doc. S/25266 (1993).
48. It was my privilege to have been consulted by this Commission.
49. Statute of the Tribunalfor War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity Committed in the
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, U.N. Doc. S/25300 (1993).
50. 1 had the honor of serving as a member of this Commission.
51. Proposal for an International War Crimes Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, U.N.
Doc. S/25307 (Feb. 18, 1993). The CSCE text was modelled after the text of the draft
statute that I had prepared and the International Association of Penal Law had pub-
lished. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Draft Statute for the Establishment of an International Criminal
Tribunal, 9 NouvELLrs ETUDES Pt NALFS (1992). This draft statute was a revision of a
text submitted by the International Institute of Higher Studies in Criminal Sciences
(ISISC) to the Eighth U.N. Congress on Crime Prevention and the Treatment of Offenders,
Havana, Cuba, 27 August-7 September 1990, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.144/NGO 7 (1990). It was
based on an earlier draft prepared by this writer for the U.N. Commission on Human
Rights, Ad Hoc Committee on Southern Africa to enforce the Apartheid Convention of Jan. 19,
1980, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1426, reprinted in 9 HorsTRA L. RE". 553 (1981); see M. CHERIF
BASSIouNI, A DRAFT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CODE AND DRTvr STATUTE FOR AN INTER-
NATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL (1987).
52. There is no official document number for this circulated, but unofficial docu-
ment.
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Council's authority to establish such a tribunal pursuant to
Chapter VII.5 3 The Mexican position echoes inter alia an earlier
Brazilian and Chinese concern expressed during the debate on
Resolution 808 that such an approach stretches the limits of in-
terpretation of Chapter VII of the Charter. While this concern is
valid, there is no other alternative for the establishment of a tri-
bunal with binding authority over all parties concerned as well as
over Member-States. But, such an ad hoc initiative must be vali-
dated by the establishment of a permanent international crimi-
nal court. Indeed, a permanent court will also validate the his-
toric ad hoc precedents, which only then will be seen as building
blocks in the making of this new international institution.
Otherwise, they will remain tainted by their ad hoc nature.
The Corell-Tuerk-Thune draft was the most detailed and
comprehensive text submitted to the United Nations. Unlike
other proposals, which viewed the tribunal as being established
by the Security Council pursuant to Chapter VII of the Charter,
the CSCE Committee contemplates that the tribunal would be
established by a multilateral Convention. This position is under-
standable because the CSCE, assuming that it would sponsor
such a proposal, could only establish such a tribunal by means of
a treaty. This has also been the ILC's position in the formula-
tion of its various proposals since 1951.P4 All of the other pro-
posals submitted to the United Nations in connection with the
ad hoc Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia were based on the Se-
curity Council's authority under Chapter VII. In no other way
could such a tribunal be mandated and its orders binding upon
all other Member-States.
The process of drafting the Statute of such an ad hoc tribu-
nal progressed through the Legal Office of the United Nations,
at the hands of skillful legal technicians and with the wide-rang-
ing input of government officials and individual experts. The
result provided was one of high legal quality though necessarily
influenced by the views of certain governments. 5 5 This explains
53. Views of the Government of Mexico Supplied Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Coun-
cil Resolution 808, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/25417 (1993).
54. See supra note 40.
55. Paragraph 13 of the Secretary-General's Report lists the following countries as
submitting suggestions regarding the tribunal's statute: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bra-
zil, Canada, Chile, China, Denmark, Egypt, Germany, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ire-
land, Italy, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Pakistan, Portugal, Russian
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in part why the Secretary-General's report was adopted without
change by Security Council Resolution 827.56
The Security Council, however, did not want to leave open
the possibility for amendments and revisions out of fear of delay-
ing the adoption of the statute. Thus, some important clarifica-
tions and refinements of the statute were not made, leaving up
to the tribunal the eventual task of clarifying certain legal issues.
One unresolved issue is the omission of Additional Protocols I
and I17 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions 8 from Article 2 of the
statute which restates the law of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.59
The statute of the ICTFY is not without legal problems and lacu-
nae, which hopefully the Tribunal's jurisprudence will resolve
satisfactorily.
Perhaps the most crucial question is whether the compe-
tence of the ICTFY to prosecute violators of the substantive law
contained in its statute can continue beyond the stage in which
the conflict affects "peace and security." This is the basis for the
sanctions power of the Security Council under Chapter VII.
When that stage passes, however, with a peace agreement be-
tween the parties, will the ICTFY still be able to exercise its juris-
Federation, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, and Yugoslavia. Report
of the Secretay-General, supra note 4, at 5. Switzerland submitted suggestions to the Secre-
tary-General as well. For a list of organizations that commented on the statute of the
tribunal, see paragraph 14 of the report. In paragraph 17, the Secretary-General stated
that he relied upon the work of the International Law Commission as well as the afore-
mentioned states and organizations. Id. at 6.
56. See S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993).
57. 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I)
(ICRC 1977); 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Proto-
col II) (ICRC 1977).
58. Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, 6 U.S.T. 3i 14; Convention for
the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of
Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85, 6 U.S.T. 3217; Convention Relative
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 6 U.S.T. 3316;
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 1949,
75 U.N.T.S. 287, 6 U.S.T. 3516.
59. See Commission of Experts Established to Security Council Resolution 780, Final Report,
U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/1994/674 (1994) (wherein the Commission concluded that
the 1977 Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions applied to the conflict as part
of international humanitarian law, even though not specifically mentioned in Article 2
of the statute).
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diction? That is a question likely to arise, and it will probably
require a decision of the International Court of Justice to deter-
mine whether the sanctions power of the Security Council under
Chapter VII can survive the stage of peace after the threat of
"peace and security" has passed.6°
III. ASSESSING THE PROCESSES OFJUSTICE
Governments, inter-governmental organizations, non-gov-
ernmental organizations, and world public attention tend to
equate the judicial process in the former Yugoslavia with the ex-
perience of the 1945 International Military Tribunal at Nurem-
berg. The latter, however, was a unique experience and what
has developed in connection with the former Yugoslavia cannot
be compared with that earlier landmark experience.
Four factors characterize and distinguish the Nuremberg
precedent: (1) the facts were beyond anyone's imagination as
the victimization was the largest in history ever to occur; (2) the
Germans were defeated and the Allies occupied Germany over
which they exercised total control; (3) a documentary trail ex-
isted because Germany had a well-established military and civil-
ian administration system that carefully recorded facts and
events; (4) the IMT proceedings were to deal only with "major
war criminals," and the proceedings were in fact limited to
twenty-four accused persons with only twenty-two actually tried.61
The case of the former Yugoslavia differs significantly: (1)
the conflict is ongoing, and no one is in complete control of the
territory or capable of seizing those who would eventually be
prosecuted; (2) there is no paper trail or documentary record
known at this stage, and the prosecutions will, thus, at first, be
essentially based on testimony with all the attendant difficulties
to that type of evidence; (3) some of the parties (the FRY, the so-
called "Serb Republic of Krajina," and the so-called "Bosnian
Serb Republic") have not recognized the competence of the
60. See, e.g., Order with Regard to Request for the Indication of Provisional Meas-
ures in the Case Concerning Questions of Interpretations and Application of the 1971
Montreal Convention Arising From Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.K.; Libya v.
U.S.), 1992 I.C.J. 3, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 662 (1992); Vera Gowlland-Debbas, The Rela-
tionship Between the International Court ofJustice and the Security Council in Light of the Lock-
erbie Case, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 643 (1994).
61. See TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS (1992) (for in-
sight into establishment of IMT).
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ICTFY; (4) the ICTFY is not going to prosecute only "major"
criminals, but the opposite is, in fact, more likely to be the case
because the decision-makers and military leaders involved in the
conduct of this conflict are the persons negotiating a political
settlement and expected to support whatever peace agreement is
reached.
Because of practical and evidentiary difficulties, the effec-
tiveness of the ICTFY prosecutions will principally depend on:
(1) a capable, committed and politically independent prosecu-
tor; (2) the availability of sufficient resources; (3) the ability to
secure the evidence in a timely fashion; (4) ensuring the safety
of victims and witnesses; (5) effective and capable management
of the Prosecutor's office; 2 (6) adequate funding by the General
Assembly; (7) political support by major governments, (8) legal
cooperation with the Tribunal by all concerned governments
and by those in whose countries there is evidence to be obtained
and accused to be apprehended; (9) reduction of U.N. bureau-
cracy in the administration of ICTFY; and (10) early judicial res-
olution of certain thorny legal issues left open by statute.
Some of these requirements are particularly significant in
testimony-driven cases, because witnesses may forget and their
stories colored by subsequent events. Furthermore, witnesses
tend to move from place to place, making it difficult and time-
consuming to subsequently locate them, which increases costs
and reduces effectiveness of the proceedings. All of these at-
tendant factors in testimony-driven cases make the timeliness of
effective investigation more significant. Delays in that stage will,
therefore, imply serious consequences on eventual prosecutions.
Additionally, the more time that passes, the less likely it is
that documents can be recovered and authenticated and, also,
that other physical evidence can be found and preserved. In
time, crime scenes change and their reconstruction becomes dif-
ficult, costly, and at times impossible.
The success or failure of the ICTFY will hinge essentially on
the political will of the major powers in the Security Council and
62. The requirements of an independent and capable Prosecutor have been satis-
fied with the appointment ofJustice Richard Goldstone of the Supreme Court of South
Africa as Prosecutor. Because the Tribunal was established in May 1993, pressures are
already evident on the Prosecutor to produce indictments, even though he only took
office on August 15, 1994. Wilbur G. Landrey, War Crimes Tribunal: More than a Fig
Leafj?, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Sept. 4, 1994, at 1A.
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the European Countries where witnesses are located. But it will
also largely depend on the practical considerations raised above.
The additional problems posed by the United Nations bureau-
cracy, which impact upon the work of the prosecutor's office,
and the limited resources available in the face of the needs aris-
ing out of such large scale victimization increase the difficulties
faced by the ICTFY.
The Prosecutor of the ICTFY will also have to contend with
a number of other issues. Two of these are particularly signifi-
cant. The first concern is how to enforce ICTFY orders for the
surrender of accused violators when a party to the conflict re-
fuses to do so. The only available means is for the Security
Council to impose sanctions. But sanctions already exist, thus
what more can be done? Furthermore, if sanctions are lifted as
part of a peace agreement, it is unlikely that they may be reim-
posed to enforce ICTFY orders. The second difficulty may arise
if the parties, in their peace agreements, include a provision al-
lowing that each party will prosecute its own alleged violators.
This has already been considered and tested in the October
1993 Agreement mediated by Lord David Owen between Fikret
Abdic, acting as leader of the self-proclaimed autonomous re-
gion of Bihac, and Radovan Karadzic, the leader of the Bosnian
Serb Republic. The Agreement was signed in Belgrade under
the watchful eye of President Milosevic of Yugoslavia. The
ICTFY can theoretically override sham national prosecutions.
But is that a likely possibility?
The cumulative effect of all these factors is that the ICTFY
faces many legal, practical, and political hurdles.
CONCLUSION
Politicians and diplomats responsible for setting up bodies
mandated to investigate and prosecute violations of interna-
tional humanitarian law often lack experience in criminal mat-
ters. A prosecutor's lack of experience in international and
comparative criminal law and procedure can affect the work and
results of the mandated bodies. Prosecutorial teams consisting
of persons from different legal systems require "team building"
and a great deal of guidance and direction as to the substantive
and procedural legal issues as well as the many questions of how
to do things in truly international endeavors. The lack of clarity
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in the applicable substantive law of ad hoc tribunals and their
potential for violating the principles of legality are also signigi-
cant hurdles to overcome.
Trials can always occur at different times and places, but
without the evidence, future trials are made more difficult, if not
impossible. Thus, the most effective way of politically compro-
mising justice is to administratively and financially delay or ob-
struct the investigative stage.6" The obvious reason is that timely
investigations can lead to politically undesired results. Indeed,
the investigation of the alleged criminal conduct by military and
political leaders who are essential to achieving a peaceful polit-
ical settlement in a given conflict can impede the political pro-
cess. This situation highlights the dilemma of pursuing political
settlements while concurrently seeking to obtain justice. The
two goals are, to say the least, incongruent. Pursuing these two
goals contemporaneously is likely to result in compromising jus-
tice in favor of political settlements. That is indeed why so many
international and non-international conflicts have resulted in de
jure or de facto immunity for the leaders, as well as most of the
perpetrators of international humanitarian law and interna-
tional human rights law violations.
As time passes, the zest for justice diminishes and world
public opinion loses its interest in international justice. That is
when a certain pragmatic realism devoid of moral-ethical values
overtakes the goal of pursuing justice. In the end, political lead-
ers who prefer political settlements to the pursuit of justice can
profess support for international justice without incurring its
political liabilities."
This well-known scenario has been in the making in connec-
63. By separating the investigative from the judicial bodies, the work of the former
may be disregarded by the latter, thereby fostering duplicating efforts. And when lim-
ited results are obtained by reason of non-reliance by prosecutorial or judicial bodies
on the prior work of investigative bodies, the funding sources may tire and reduce their
future support.
64. This is what leads some thinkers to believe that a more realistic goal than that
of international criminal justice is the establishment of "truth commissions." Herman
Schwartz, What Can We Do About Balkan Atrocities?, N.Y. TIMES, April 9, 1993, at 27A.
"[T]ruth commissions" serve a useful purpose where one or a few facts need to be
ascertained, like in the El-Mozote mass killing in El-Salvador and the murder of the
Jesuit priests in that country. See Commission on Truth for El Salvador, Annex to Report,
U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/25500 (1993). When it comes to large scale victimization,
however, there is no substitute for careful and impartial criminal investigations.
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tion with the pursuit of justice in the former Yugoslavia, un-
daunted by the criticism of those who believe that international
justice should not be compromised by political objectives. Re-
grettably, this scenario has happened so frequently in connec-
tion with different conflicts that it has become a practice by
political leaders and diplomats who considerjustice as a trade-off
for peace.
But allowing violators of international humanitarian law to
benefit from de jure or de facto immunity enhances further vio-
lence and reduces deterrence. The consequences are increased
violence in international relations and also increased manifesta-
tions of international and domestic criminality. Because all vio-
lence is on a continuum, what is permitted to go uncontrolled at
one end of the continuum affects all other parts.
Every conflict brings painful reminders of the need for a
permanent international criminal court,65 or at least for a per-
manent international investigative body. The complacency of
government leaders consistently results in inaction, compelling
the need for occasional ad hoc tribunals that necessarily have eth-
ical weaknesses and present other legal and practical difficulties.
As a prelude to the establishment of a permanent interna-
tional criminal tribunal, the creation of this ad hoc Tribunal is
both a test and a challenge that should not be allowed to fail.
Any such failure or discrediting of the ICTFY will encourage
rather than deter future violators of international humanitarian
law. Establishing an ad hoc international criminal tribunal to try
the authors of war crimes in the former Yugoslavia symbolizes
the United Nations' dedication to the rule of law and the inter-
national legal order. Now, the world community must face the
challenge of vesting that tribunal with the political support, re-
sources, and other means necessary to bring justice to bear on
those who transgress international humanitarian law.
65. After the Gulf Conflict militarily ended in 1991, there were demands for an ad
hoc war crimes tribunal to try Saddam Hussein and some Iraqi military personnel, but
nothing came of it. This was not, however, the case for Cambodia's Pol Pot and Khmer
Rouge, who are responsible for an estimated two million deaths. See War Crimes: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 26-32 (1991) (statement of M. Cherif Bassiouni, Pro-
fessor of Law, DePaul College of Law); id. at 44-56 (statement of Howard Levie, Profes-
sor Emeritus of Law, St. Louis University); id. at 64-73 (statement ofJohn Norton, Pro-
fessor of Law, University of Virginia); id. at 10-15 (statement of Telford Taylor, Briga-
dier General Ret. and Professor of Law, Cardozo Law School).
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Until a clear-cut value-judgement is made to establish a per-
manent system of international criminal justice free from inter-
ferences and manipulations by those who are engaged in the
political processes, the world community will be condemned to
compromise justice and undermine the moral-ethical founda-
tion of international relations.
Above all, it must never be forgotten that without justice,
there can be no peace because peace is reconciliation between
people and not a political settlement between leaders. For rec-
onciliation between people to occur, there must be impartial,
even-handed, and fair justice based upon the truth.
